By:
Ronald D.
Struck
November
1991
A
PENDULUM SWINGS -
IT DOESN'T GO IN CIRCLES
It
is said that successful real estate developers and investors must be
born optimists, and lenders born pessimists.
But eternal optimism or pessimism is dangerous because they
assume economic trends can move in the same direction indefinitely.
People who believe this I call Unrealists.
Long term success requires people to be Realists.
Realists make decisions recognizing that the economy moves like
a pendulum, swinging back and forth between highs and lows, albeit
with no regularity and seldom on the same path.
However, it never goes in circles.
When
the economy is booming, decisions that incorporate a pessimistic
outlook are very difficult to make.
And when we're in the tank, it's even more difficult to
aggressively make optimistic decisions.
Currently, developers, lenders, and investors are overwhelmed
with pessimism about further declines in real estate values.
Many people seem to feel that values are continually going to
fall. It is difficult to locate the rare Realist who knows that
obviously can't happen.
Yes,
the economy has declined substantially.
There are plenty of data constantly reported by the media that
support this fact. Real estate is well into a major downward cycle
that began in 1989. Projections
for further significant declines would have to assume a near collapse
of the economy. If you
believe that a collapse is unlikely, that the current pessimistic
environment is more like 1982 than 1932, then this could be a rare
opportunity to make profitable investments in real estate.
By 1995, and perhaps even as early as 1993, investments made
now may prove to be exceptionally timely and astute.
The
basic rule of successful investing is to buy low and sell high. But
Realists are fully aware of the impossibility of consistently
acquiring investments only at the lowest points in cycles, and selling
only at the highest points. Realists
actively manage their investments based upon their anticipation of
likely changes in the swings, buying when they believe there is a
greater probability of a shift to an upswing, and selling when they
believe the opposite.
What
do Unrealists do? Typically
very little other than riding with the swings wherever they are taken.
When the economy is expanding and profits come easily,
regardless of capabilities, Unrealists develop a false sense of
brilliance and become overly optimistic.
Because most of their assets are increasing in value,
Unrealists think they know their markets like no one else and they are
managing their investments superbly.
They also believe this trend will continue unabated.
Unrealists become almost euphoric, thinking that the only
things restricting their profitability are the limits on their ability
to expand. They make as
many new investments as their borrowing capacity will permit.
After all, the economic cycle can only keep going UP, right?
Wrong!
Like a pendulum, cycles always come DOWN.
The economy contracts, causing profits and net worth to become
extremely difficult to maintain.
Although the Unrealists did not take advantage of opportunities
available during the upswing to protect themselves, they accept little
if any responsibility for their plight.
They blame overall economic conditions, the government and
other such things, that they quickly point out are beyond their
control. An Unrealist's
new operating strategy seldom calls for facing the reality of new
market conditions, because that would involve recognizing the losses
that are now built into their portfolios.
Instead, as though they had some other choice, they decide to
ride out the cycle, doing everything they can to hold onto their
investments until the next upswing.
But, when they begin incurring operating losses and their
creditors won't carry them any longer, they are forced to sell off
assets at depressed prices (usually to Realists). If they have enough assets they may still be around for the
next upswing, but in a much weaker condition than when the downswing
started.
What
about the handful of investors who continue doing well during the
downturn, taking advantage of the opportunities to acquire assets at
attractive levels? The
Unrealists say they are just lucky.
I say they made their own luck because they are Realists.
Realists know that the three most important criteria for making good
real estate investments are NOT - location, location, location.
They are - location, financing, and timing.
Of these, timing can be the most profitable or the most deadly.
It is essential that swings in economic conditions be carefully
monitored and evaluated so that intelligent projections and profitable
decisions can be made.
As
a Realist, it's good to have an optimistic outlook for the real estate
market. Let me explain.
I got myself into a lot of trouble in 1989 for being
pessimistic. In 1988 I
was chief financial officer of a $4 billion S&L in California.
As 1988 drew to a close, economic conditions in California were
strong and consumer confidence was very high.
Real estate developers and lenders were aggressively expanding
and competing for business. In December 1988, I produced a cautious and conservative 1989
strategic financial plan, reflecting my concern that the economic pendulum had
swung too far. I believed
the prevailing consumer optimism would be unsustainable and that a
major downward shift in the economy and real estate market was
imminent. The plan
included the following statements:
"We
believe a combination of a general economic downturn, volatile market
conditions and new restrictive regulatory capital requirements will
make 1989 a time of extreme stress for the (banking) industry..."
"A
recession will reduce mortgage rates and home prices, but employment
and home sales will also contract...
(The recession) will adversely affect our primary market area
of Southern California via three microeconomic factors specific to
Southern California; a) The real estate bubble may finally burst... b)
The airline industry could experience a contraction... c) Federal
spending in military and space could fall as attempts are made to
reduce the federal deficit in the face of declining revenues if a
recession sets in. (California
receives twenty five percent of the Pentagon's outlays and an even
higher share of NASA's expenditures.)
Reduced spending in these areas could also raise unemployment,
reduce some real estate values and raise loan defaults in our market
area."
"In
this type of external environment, improving the capital and liquidity
position is paramount. This
may involve further securitization of assets, shrinkage of assets and
foregoing of current earnings to reduce risks."
The
vice-chairman of the bank, in my opinion an Unrealist, was optimistic that
the upswing in the economy would continue for some time. He was furious about the views and precautionary steps
recommended in the plan, saying they were outlandishly conservative
and reflected a lack of the entrepreneurial spirit the bank needed in
order to achieve its growth objectives.
In February 1989, he fired me for writing the cautionary plan and the bank's president for
supporting it. Thereafter, he obtained the approval of the board of directors to
pursue an expansion plan that reflected his optimistic outlook.
As
the saying goes - hindsight can give a twenty-twenty view of past
events. During the first
three quarters of 1989, the S&L pursued the vice-chairman's aggressive growth plan,
adding enormous amounts of exotic loans and real estate to an already
high risk portfolio. But, in
the fourth quarter, the economic cycle shifted dramatically and rapidly
downward. At year end,
the S&L reported major portfolio losses. In late 1990, the vice-chairman
was forced to resign and, in 1991, the S&L was taken
over by the regulators and put into receivership.
So,
in 1988 I was right when I went against the
prevailing optimism and strongly recommended curtailing investments.
Now, I believe it is time to go against the prevailing
pessimism. The next
twelve to eighteen months will prove to be an unusually attractive
opportunity to selectively acquire real estate investments that can
generate superior long term returns. Remember, this view is coming
from someone who got fired in 1989 for taking a cautionary position
based upon a pessimistic outlook.
The S&L should have listened to me back then.
But, if you are currently making your decisions based upon a
pessimistic outlook, perhaps you should consider my optimistic outlook now.

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